WinBkg
BigWindow BackArrow top
War Stories

The Killing of Mark Schmidt & His Gunship Crew - Dec 1967

Summary by Troop Commander Tom Fleming - Notes by Heavy Scout Section Leader Bruce Powell

Accident Report, - Daily Staff Journal

Loss of Heavy Scout Gunship 468 by Tom Fleming

On 27 December 1967 D Troop was tasked by the 25th Infantry Division to scramble a Light Fire Team to assist a unit of the 325th Airborne Infantry, 101st Airborne Division that was engaged in a fire fight less than a kilometer north West of the “Ann Margaret” perimeter outpost. This was the units first venture outside of the Chu Chi Base Camp since its arrival in Vietnam less than a month earlier and being assigned to Chu Chi for training. Several platoons were apparently firing on each other thinking they were being ambushed, each mistaking the other for the enemy, the Battalion Commander overhead in a command and control helicopter could not control the actions of the elements on the ground who believed the fire they were receiving was from enemy forces. The insertion of the company commander on the ground with his HQ. group was not helping the situation.
On 27 December D Troop was in the midst of moving lock stock and barrel from the North West side of the Chu Chi main runway to a newly constructed area on the South West side of the runway. The unit was in an operational stand down status (the first operational stand down since arriving in country). The 25th Division Commander was flying in his C&C helicopter over the situation on the ground observing the chaos below and called for D Troop to send a LT Fire Team to help sort out the entangled units and stop the carnage.
At D Troop Operations a light fire team was posted on stand by for contingencies while the move was taking place. The two helicopters were heavy scout 468 (lead) commanded by WO1 Mark Schmidt and a (wing) weapons section “Hog” commanded by 1LT Charlie Johnson.
After taking off and flying at low level the fire team approached the unit and applying standard practices, e.g. call the units involved and tell them to cease fire and he would mark each of their positions with smoke. All external fires were checked, and none were firing in support. Repeated calls were made to each of the 325 elements to cease fire. Most units acknowledged, but it was apparent that internal fire control by the units was less than fully compliant. As 468 was making a low pass dropping smoke on units it was struck by a projectile in the mast area and the rotor head separated from the aircraft. The resulting crash and post-crash fire killed WO1 Mark V. Schmidt, Aircraft Commander; WO1 Howard D. Anderson, Pilot; SP5 Rodger L. Henson, Crew Chief; and SP4 John P. Barsch, Gunner.
The D Troop Commander and Flight Operations officer were out of the area at the time of the crash but arrived airborne on scene shortly. Their contact with the Battalion Commander to get the friendly fire to cease and allow D Troop to recover the KIAs was prolonged and contentious, but not successful. The 325 Airborne elements continued firing on each other and the efforts of the ground commanders were ineffective. It took several hours for the ground situation to settle down and as darkness was falling the D Troop Commander was able to pick up his KIAs with his helicopter.
Post-crash investigation was not able determine what type of projectile hit the mast and caused the destruction of the helicopter. In investigative Interview of the 325 Battalion Commander he claimed adamantly that his unit was engaged with an enemy force and that the fire that brought down 468 came from the enemy not his troops. There was considerable conjecture that the projectile was a 40mm grenade and that it was fired by friendly forces. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary the crew of 468 were declared Kill in Action.

The Loss of Mark Schmidt and his Gunship Crew - 27 Dec 1967: by 1LT Bruce Powell

Very little was said on our website these past years about this tragedy. Reading Tom Flemings summary has given me detailed flashbacks of that day. I rememeber it like yesterday. I also remember being pressured to not express my thoughts and notes in favor of sparing the families. Maybe it is time now to correct that.

Mark was a close friend. We knew each other in Flight school. He was the oldest in the Warrant class and I was probably the oldest in the Officer Class at Fort Rucker.

It was the first Maintenance day off ever for the Centaurs. It was hot; most were in T shirts working on the line, or on break in the hootch. When I heard the siren I ran to operations to see what the hell was going on. For some reason no other unit was availabe to respond. The 101st had been training and raising hell on this damn Infantry Division Base camp. I think they were trained more for bravado and bragging than for guerrilla combat. They finally gave them ammo and sent them on a training mission NorthWest of Cu Chi in the tunnel infested jungle of the Hobo Woods. The VC popped up between two units of the Battalion and got the inexperienced troops to shooting the hell out of each other. Mark, flyiing lead came in low, nearly seconds after take off with Charlie and his Heavy Weapons crew as high wing. I was never able to get Charlie Johnson to say much about it afterwards (he was supposed to be lead that day). Everyone was in total shock when we heard the explosion and saw the billowing black smoke. I ran to the first aircraft available with a crew (they were pulling maint. It may have been a red Xed one) and jumped in. Someone stuck a helmet on me and we took off hoping to provide rescue. I realized i was in a friggen unarmed slick! Seconds after takeoff I was over the wreckage (way too low) and we were now in the middle of a gun battle of the two 101st units. It was clear that no one survived the wreckage, but I wanted to be sure. I broke away to avoid getting shot down. I'm sure that Charlie had already called in the situation. But I frantically called opns and said to get someone on this, that there were two units shooting each other up. We heard one rumor later of a sergeant who said he was yelling at his M79 guy, hiding in a ditch and shooting straight up, to cease fire.

It was always clear to me that they were shot down by an M79. An RPG would not have had time to arm at that low altitude (50 to 150 feet).

I don't remember if we or Johnson took hits. When I landed at the Corral and stepped out of the aircraft and damn near broke my leg. Not use to the height of the slick compared to my low rider gunship. I wish that I had spent more time finding those involved and getting their statements (like Dave Bossary). My hope is that some are still around and can add to the story. My respect for the 101st Airborne was never the same.

Dave Bossary Notes: Dave was with Charlie Johnson when Mark Schmidt and crew were killed. Charlie was lead. Mark had no FM, so Mark went low and Charlie flew high bird with his FM.

Howard Anderson took Pat Eastes place on standby that day (as Mark's CoPilot) so he could go to the PX. Mark was training Pat at that time. They were close. Tough to take even this 57 years later. Pat provided the photo of the crash site (#44 in his Slideshow).

Accident Report: Was not an official report

This was a Combat incident. This helicopter was LOSS TO INVENTORY
for Close Air Support
While On Target this helicopter was Attacking at 0200 feet and 080 knots.
The station for this helicopter was Hau Nghia in South Vietnam
Helicopter took 1 hits from:
Explosive Weapon; Non-Artillery launched or static weapons containing explosive charges. (REC RIF)
The helicopter was hit in the Main Rotor Blade System causing a Blast.

Short Summary: Main Rotor severed by M-79 round on UH-1C gunship at Cu Chi at 50 ft.
Aircraft: UH-1C tail number 65-09468

 

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OUR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG, 27 December 1967 shows: Item No. 29., 1539 hours, Maj De Loch from ADAO had us scramble gun team, 101st in heavy contact at XT637191, Cen will come up of [on] 48.20 contact 1st Strike. 
Item No. 30., 1545 hours, LFT airborne 1545H. 
Item No. 31., 1558 hours, Cen 22 shot down in support of 1st Strike. 
Item No. 32., 1600 hours, Requested gun team and slick for support of downed chopter [sic]. 
Item No. 33., 1612 hours, Cen has two gunteam up in support of 1st Strike. 
Item No. 34., 1614 hours, ask to have Diamond Head on stand by
Item No. 35., 1631 hours, Dustoff ship unable to go in was returning to CC and picked 1 indiv mail (eligible) XT 623187 vic. 
Item No. 36., 1645 hours, SC alerted to possible reaction to downed chopter [sic]. 
Item No. 37., 1650 hours, XT627187 ship went down, shot down, believe all KHA's. 
Item No. 38., Cen 42 replacement gunteam on station. 
Item No. 39., 1720 hours, T6 as long as Strike elem are in area no Tropic elem goes in unless T6 says so. 
Item No. 40., 1721 hours, S6, Cin 6: over area checking with Strike, if they are going to get bodies out or not-S6 believed he can observe 3 bodies. 
Item No. 42., 1755 hours, Notified Cin to have slicks on to go get remains of Cen 22 crew and ship. 
Item No. 43., 1759 hours, Diamond Head 20 overseen of contact, Strike 6 ordered to secure down aircraft and recover remains and equipment off Cen 22 and return to secure perimeter where will extract remains and equipment. 
Item No. 44., 1800 hours, Cen to replace Diamondhead over contact area
Item No. 50., 1845 hours, 4 Cent 22 crew on way to Strike perimeter. 
Item No. 51., 1850 hours, Cen will pickup remains of Cen 22 tonight when Strike gets them to their perimeter. 
Item No. 52., 1855 hours, Cen 22 remains and guns and secure area, Cen airborne this time to pickup. 
Item No. 55., 1912 hours, Cen airborne with remains and guns of Cen 22.